 incursion. The PKK, albeit under a new name, would join the fight. War would have spillover effects, with Kurds in Turkey, Iraq, Iran and the diaspora rising up this time, Syrian Kurdish sources warn. Erdogan’s pledges for “a terror-free Turkey” would go up in smoke.){kind=link}
Turkey is threatening military action against a Syrian Kurdish military group that forms the backbone of the Syrian Democratic Forces unless the group disarms and folds into the national army, which is now being formed by Syria’s interim government. The group, known as the YPG, is the Syrian franchise of the Kurdistan Workers Party, the rebel army that had been waging an armed campaign against the Turkish state until it announced its dissolution in May.
On Wednesday in a joint news conference in Ankara with his Syrian counterpart, Asaad al-Shibani, Turkish foreign minister Hakan Fidan delivered yet another threat to the SDF to abide by the March 10 agreement it signed with Syria’s interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, for the integration of Kurdish-led military and civilian structures in northeast Syria into the new Syrian state. Fidan accused the Syrian Kurdish leadership of “playing for time” and being “Israel’s pawns” in line with Israeli efforts to keep Damascus weak. “In an environment where Turkey’s security concerns are not addressed, there is no way for us to remain calm here,” Fidan warned. Meanwhile, Shibani rebuked the SDF over an Aug. 13 conference in the city of al-Hasakah, during which minority groups called for a new democratic constitution.
Fidan’s comments came as Turkey’s defense minister, Yasar Guler, and his Syrian counterpart, Murhaf Abu Qasra, signed a far-reaching memorandum on military cooperation through which Turkey would train and equip Syrian government forces, including in counterterrorism operations, notably against the Islamic State.
Middle East Eye’s Turkey correspondent, Ragip Soylu, cited unidentified security sources on Wednesday who said that the Turkish military could provide “indirect support for a limited operation by the Syrian army” against the SDF and that preparations for such an operation “had already been completed.” Soylu added that the US’ Syria envoy, Tom Barrack, had “requested more time” for diplomacy with the SDF.
Syria in Transition reported that it was at Turkey’s urging that Shibani traveled to Moscow on July 31, where he met with Russia’s foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, and President Vladimir Putin. “Russia’s support will be pivotal if Turkey decides to resolve the Kurdish issue in the old-fashioned way. This could involve a Syrian army offensive supported by Turkish airpower, in a repeat of the 2016, 2018, and 2019 operations, all of which had been coordinated with Moscow,” the report noted, citing unidentified sources.
Against this backdrop can one conclude that unless the SDF caves — and soon — a joint Turkish- Syrian military operation against the SDF is in the offing. Despite the rhetoric, though, such an outcome is highly unlikely, for a number of reasons:
What army? Most immediately, Syria’s army is much too powerless to take on a force as large, cohesive and motivated as the SDF. With estimates of 50,000 to 100,000 men and women under arms, the SDF has been trained and partially equipped by the Pentagon. It remains combat-ready after a five-year war against ISIS, and it has been preparing itself for potential attacks by Turkey and the new Syrian government. In contrast, the Syrians’ dismal performance in Suwayda exposed Syrian forces as weak and undisciplined. Sharaa is widely known to be reluctant to take on the Kurds and has long resisted Turkish pressure to do so. War with the Kurds would leave him even weaker at a time when the economy remains in shambles, pledges of Gulf billions remain on paper and public sector salaries remain unpaid.
The Israel factor: If Syrian government forces attack the Kurds, Israel could intervene with air strikes against them, including on government sites in Damascus, as it did in defense of the Druze last month, dealing yet another humiliating blow to whatever remains of Sharaa’s forces. Israel would refrain from doing so if any Turkish ground forces were involved. Despite having rock-bottom relations, Israel does not want a military confrontation with Turkey, a NATO member, any more than Turkey does with Israel.
The Trump factor: Turkey is not likely to send ground troops into Syria because it cannot predict Trump’s reaction. He is unlikely to greenlight a Turkish invasion, as he did in 2019. Congress remains very sympathetic toward the Kurds and broadly hostile toward Turkey. The horrors inflicted on the Druze in Suwayda, the deadly June attacks on Christians in Damascus and the coastal massacres of Alawites in March have marred Sharaa’s reputation. As much as Trump admires Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, he could turn on him with sanctions and other measures as he did in 2019. Turkey’s wobbly economy would reel. It’s worth noting that the far-right activist Laura Loomer, who has Trump’s ear and is credited with getting former national security adviser Michael Waltz fired, has already called for Barrack to be removed over his perceived leniency toward Sharaa. Little wonder, then, that Barrack has toned down his anti-SDF rhetoric in recent weeks and posted flattering remarks about the SDF commander in chief, Mazlum Kobane. Sharaa could well see US sanctions being slapped back on Syria as well.
Erdogan’s political future: One of the main factors offsetting possible Turkish military operations against the SDF is Erdogan’s concern that such action could blow up his plans to secure Kurdish support at home in order to remain in power. Turkey’s ongoing peace talks with PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan are meant to bust the electoral alliance between the Kurds and the Republican People’s Party, the main opposition. Erdogan also needs Kurdish support in the parliament to hold a referendum on amending the constitution so that he can serve a third term beyond 2028, when his current term expires. That scenario is already looking shaky, as the Kurds continue to press for constitutional changes that would enshrine their own rights as well. This would alienate Turkish nationalist voters. The safer option is for Erdogan to garner enough parliamentary backing, notably from the Kurds, to hold snap elections that would allow him to bypass constitutional term limits without holding a referendum.
But to sustain Kurdish support in the absence of concessions on Kurdish constitutional rights, Erdogan would have to lay off the SDF. Peace with the Syrian Kurds and the promise of amnesty for PKK fighters and jailed Kurdish politicians including Ocalan were touted by the government as the Kurds’ biggest gains when secret negotiations started in the spring of last year.
The Ocalan factor: Ocalan went along with the government’s demands that he get the PKK to end its more than four-decade insurgency against the Turkish state. The PKK complied, declaring an end to the campaign, and, in a symbolic gesture, a group of PKK fighters burned their weapons last month in a well-choreographed photo-op in the mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan. However, Ocalan has not told the YPG to follow suit, and he is unlikely to do so until the Syrian Kurds are offered an acceptable deal by Damascus. He has suggested that this could be less than full federalism or autonomy, thus creating room for compromise, but so far neither Damascus nor Ankara is showing any willingness to strike one. The Kurdish position is that time is on their side. Either Damascus gives them a fair shake or they wait things out. Without Kurdish support, their thinking goes, Sharaa may not be able to survive.
All or something: Amid all the chest-pounding, Ankara’s maximalist posture — that Syria’s Kurds cede all for nothing — has produced some results. The Kurds still talk about federalism, but federalism in Syria is off the table. The Turks opposed negotiations between the Kurds and Damascus being held under US and French auspices in Paris. The planned Paris talks were cancelled but were resumed this week in Damascus. The ongoing wrangles are over the Kurdish-controlled areas of the Arab-majority province of Deir ez-Zor, which are home to significant natural gas reserves. Damascus wants them back. The Kurds insist that all such matters need to be negotiated as part of a broader package that would guarantee Kurdish rights.
Bottom line: Turkey’s threat of resuming military operations can be effective in wresting Kurdish concessions for as long as it remains unexercised. With no ISIS to distract them, Syria’s Kurds would fiercely resist a Turkish (or Syrian) incursion. The PKK, albeit under a new name, would join the fight. War would have spillover effects, with Kurds in Turkey, Iraq, Iran and the diaspora rising up this time, Syrian Kurdish sources warn. Erdogan’s pledges for “a terror-free Turkey” would go up in smoke.
All sides will need to settle for less than they would like if conflict is to be averted. For the reasons cited above, war remains the least likely outcome in the short- to medium-term. However, given the history of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict in Syria and the volatility of events in Syria and the wider region, it cannot be ruled out.