After years of political deadlock over the sale of Eurofighters to Turkey, Ankara appears to be nearing success with pending deals for new and secondhand versions of the aircraft.
Turkey’s determined effort to acquire Eurofighter Typhoon jets is finally approaching success, through a framework that brings together European and Gulf partners in one of Ankara’s most consequential defense projects in years.
On Oct. 27, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer signed a $10.7 billion agreement in Ankara for the purchase of 20 new Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft, having revived negotiations frozen since 2023. The Eurofighter, Europe’s most advanced combat aircraft, is coordinated through a consortium of Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom, which centralize production and export decisions.
The deal followed a Gulf tour by Erdogan the preceding week, during which Ankara advanced talks with Qatar and Oman on acquiring 24 secondhand Eurofighters, 12 from each country, as part of a broader plan to modernize its air force.
The agreement reached with Starmer ends nearly two years of political deadlock inside the Eurofighter consortium. A veto by Berlin had blocked progress despite support by London, Madrid and Rome for a deal with Ankara. Along with Starmer’s mediation between Turkey and the consortium as well as a policy shift in Berlin under Chancellor Friedrich Merz, the other key to unlocking the deal was the role of Turkey’s Gulf partners in potentially shortening the usual induction cycle for a new combat platform — typically three to five years — by providing in-service aircraft and training access that could allow Ankara to field the jets within 12 to 18 months, pending final approval by the consortium.
Bid for air superiority
Turkey’s renewed push to acquire the Eurofighter Typhoon stems from a combination of strategic urgency and industrial ambition. The Turkish Air Force still largely relies on a fleet of US-built F-16C/Ds and aging F-4E Phantoms, many of them approaching the end of their operational life.
Meanwhile, regional dynamics have shifted. Greece’s acquisition of 24 French-made Rafale jets in early 2025 and Israel’s dominance over contested Syrian airspace have together intensified the pressure on Ankara to secure an equivalent platform as quickly as possible.
To address this gap, Erdogan had long sought to purchase 40 new F-16 Block 70s from the United States. Washington formally approved the sale in January 2024, but negotiations remain ongoing, with Turkey attempting to scale back the $23 billion package — seen as inflated by weapons and support costs — and regain full access to spare parts and modernization kits that were restricted after the US suspended deliveries in response to Ankara’s purchase of Russian S-400 missiles.
Turkey’s parallel bid to join the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program collapsed in 2019, when Washington — invoking the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) — blocked Ankara from it following its acquisition of S-400 air defense systems. The decision cut off Turkey’s access to fifth-generation technology and deepened its determination to build independent capabilities.
Ankara is also expanding its defense-industrial footprint, investing heavily in indigenous unmanned systems, avionics and engine development. Yet, big-ticket domestic alternatives, such as the fifth-generation TF-X KAAN fighter, remain years from full deployment.
In this context, the Eurofighter Typhoon offers an immediate bridge solution: a twin-engine, multirole 4.5-generation aircraft capable of both air superiority and precision-strike missions. Talks with the United Kingdom and the Eurofighter consortium began in 2023 but stalled over German objections. The Oct. 27 agreement with the United Kingdom signals Berlin’s tacit approval, opening the way for deliveries to begin in 2026.
As uncertainty persists over US-Turkish relations, the Eurofighter deal not only fills a pressing operational gap but also reduces Turkey’s dependence on US systems, easing pressure on its prestigious KAAN fighter program and forging a bridge between its domestic industry and the broader European and Gulf defense ecosystems.
The new order negotiated with Starmer follows recent contracts by Eurofighter consortium members for new jets: Germany, 20; Spain, 25; and Italy, up to 24.
Gulf Typhoons
Before Turkey’s pending acquisition of Eurofighters, the Gulf was the only major hub of the planes outside Europe, with regional air forces operating around 20% of all such aircraft delivered — 121 out of 613 as of September 2025. This concentration of fleets has turned the Gulf into a proving ground as well as a reservoir of expertise for Ankara’s acquisition drive.
Saudi Arabia remains the largest Gulf operator of Eurofighters, with 48 Tranche 2 and 24 Tranche 3A aircraft, delivered between 2009 and 2019. The kingdom has long been the consortium’s anchor export client, and negotiations for an additional batch of Tranche 4 or 5 jets are reportedly under review.
Kuwait, the most recent purchaser of Eurofighters, ordered 28 Tranche 3A aircraft and has so far received 15 through a joint BAE Systems–Leonardo program, which also supports training and maintenance.
Qatar, however, sits at the center of the current developments. The Qatar Emiri Air Force operates 24 Tranche 3A jets, all received between 2022 and 2024, and in December 2024 confirmed an additional order for 12 Tranche 4 units in its next delivery cycle. Several of the earlier model Eurofighters — fitted with the Praetorian Defensive Aids Sub-System (DASS) and the PIRATE infrared search-and-track suite — are the ones being considered for transfer to Turkey, pending reexport approval by the four consortium partners.
Qatar, Turkey’s closest ally in the Gulf, is well positioned to accommodate Ankara’s request. It hosts Ankara’s largest overseas deployment, roughly 3,000 Turkish troops, at the Tariq bin Ziyad military base, a joint Qatari-Turkish installation. Turkish pilots have been training on Qatari Typhoons for several years, under bilateral defense agreements, ensuring familiarity with the platform and facilitating its eventual integration into the Turkish Air Force.
Oman operates a smaller fleet of 12 Tranche 3 Typhoons, delivered between 2017 and 2019. Its longstanding cooperation with the United Kingdom’s Royal Air Force and BAE Systems makes it a technically and politically viable donor to Turkey. A partial or complete sale to Ankara would free resources for Muscat to pursue upgrades or future acquisitions, perhaps including newer Eurofighter batches, while maintaining defense ties with both Western and regional partners.
The proposed resale to Ankara would mark the Eurofighter’s first intra-regional transfer, signaling the Gulf’s emergence not only as a high-end defense market but also as an increasingly active supplier and enabler in global arms circulation.
Next steps and strategic outlook
The path ahead hinges on political approval and logistical sequencing. For Turkey, the acquisition of aircraft from the Gulf offers two immediate advantages: availability and interoperability. While the 20 UK-built Typhoons covered by the Oct. 27 deal are expected to arrive at intervals over the coming years, acquiring secondhand jets from Qatar and Oman could allow Ankara to field the aircraft much sooner — potentially within a year of final approval, with the first Gulf-origin Typhoons expected to arrive sometime in 2026. In other words, the Gulf acquisitions would allow Turkey to bridge the gap until new Tranche 4 models roll off consortium production lines.
Most of Doha’s Tranche 3A jets are practically new, delivered between 2022 and 2024, and several have logged only minimal flight hours. They also conform to NATO standards already integrated by BAE Systems. Oman’s experience in maintenance and logistics would further help Ankara establish a local support base, accelerating the platform’s operationalization.
Erdogan confirmed the state of Gulf negotiations during a press briefing in Ankara on Oct. 23, following his tour of Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait, saying that talks with Doha and Muscat were “technically detailed but progressing positively.”
For Qatar and Oman, the benefits of an agreement are both practical and strategic. Reexporting part of their fleets frees budgetary and operational space to rotate inventory, potentially replacing older Typhoons with upgraded Tranche 4 or 5s. London reportedly supports the Turkey-Qatar transfer, confident that Doha will compensate the decrease in its fighters by ordering new aircraft.
According to defense sources, the Qatari-Turkish proposal is structured as a sub-transfer agreement, allowing Doha to maintain its procurement status while supporting Ankara’s modernization. In return, Qatar could gain access to Turkish defense programs, such as participation in the KAAN fighter initiative or coproduction of missile and avionics systems.
This form of “strategic offset diplomacy” reflects the evolving nature of Middle Eastern defense cooperation, in which partners leverage shared projects to accelerate modernization and influence regional balance. For Turkey, Qatar’s involvement provides an immediate workaround to avoid waiting for new Eurofighter production slots, which are currently overbooked amid high demand.
Oman, with its traditionally neutral diplomacy, provides a complementary channel, granting Turkey logistical access to the Arabian Sea and a discreet regional interlocutor distinct from Doha, which takes a more assertive approach.