PALOMAR, 16/11/2026,
“Autocracy à la Turque”: How Organised Crime Conquers the Top Echelons of Government/Yavuz Baydar/Substack
Substack, 16/11/2026
Absolute power not only corrupts, but at the end, it also becomes the captive of its own greedy cadres. The latest fund-fraud is how far Turkey has gone in decay.
| Yavuz BaydarNov 15 |
“One of the most baffling phenomena of our age: huge numbers of people put their faith in national populists who turn out to be crooks, steal vast amounts of public money, and make nothing better for their voters,” wrote John O’Brennan —Professor of European Politics, and Rule of Law— in a recent social-media post.
Truly, one wonders why.
His was a rapid reaction to what was recently exposed in Hungary. Nearly $20 million in cash has been found hidden in farms and buried in forests as part of an investigation into Viktor Orbán’s government, reported the BBC. Miklós Seszták, who served as minister of national development for four years, is accused of accepting bribes as part of a scheme involving the state transport company.
Hungary’s new prime minister, Péter Magyar, who unseated Orbán in a landslide election, described it as the end of the “mafia”. “Fidesz, as a political party, has ceased to exist. From today, it is officially nothing more than an organised criminal group,” he posted.
This may not have come as a surprise. History has taught us that, although culture—generally backed by religious teachings—is the most resistant element to change — except under the magnetic force of money. History has also taught us that authoritarianism is often a shortcut to corruption: it creates privileged classes promoted through power, which itself remains unchecked.
No wonder, then, that the rising wave of autocrats has given birth to mafia-style governance across the spectrum.

What we see in Turkey, after the eruption of the latest scandal, is a symptom of exactly that: organised crime shaped like an octopus at the highest levels of power. Multiply Hungary’s case in volume and scale, and it is not difficult to estimate how much trouble President Erdoğan—and, especially, his ruling AKP—is in.
A massive investment-fund fraud and stock-market manipulation scheme has rattled the country for weeks, despite official efforts to silence what remains of the independent media. It has proved too vast to cover up.
Brief recap (those who are informed about it, can jump into the next section):
The mechanism, resembling a pump-and-dump operation with Ponzi-like financing—“Fonzi”, in Turkey—surfaced on 15 September, when Pusula Portföy disclosed that it could not meet investors’ redemption requests.
An August regulatory clampdown on concentrated holdings had preceded mounting withdrawals; forced selling exposed the mismatch between inflated valuations and available cash. On 17 September, the capital-markets regulator, SPK, ordered 131 funds belonging to seven managers into liquidation.
According to the Financial Times investigation, funds accumulated large positions in thinly traded, interconnected companies. Purchases drove up share prices and, consequently, the funds’ reported asset values. Spectacular returns attracted fresh money, which financed further purchases, sustaining the cycle. Corporate bond issuance also helped finance share purchases and withdrawals.
The affected funds held approximately TL825–826 billion, with later reporting putting their combined assets at around $20 billion—not a verified amount stolen or permanently lost.
Separately, Justice Minister Akın Gürlek reported TL187.653 billion (€3.37 billion) in gains earned by 141 individuals and 73 companies.
The latest official tally, announced by Vice-President Cevdet Yılmaz on 14 November, is 466 suspects, 123 people remanded in custody and 279 under judicial supervision.
The inquiry reaches fund executives, financial regulators and political figures. Those remanded include former family minister Fatma Betül Sayan Kaya, Borsa Istanbul chief executive Korkmaz Enes Ergun, and former Takasbank head Yunus Arıncı.
Şahap Kavcıoğlu, president of the Banking Regulation and Supervision Authority (BDDK) and a former governor of the Central Bank of Turkey, had to resign hastily from his post—allegedly forced to do so by a furious Erdoğan.
As a columnist, Umur Talu, suggested:
“Take a look at the banknotes in your pocket or wallet—for whatever they are still worth. Four of the people whose signatures are on them are now either in custody or have been sacked!”
The sheer irony, which exposes the magnitude of the scandal, is written on Turkish banknotes.
“The public still has no idea who profited from these transactions or by how much, while nearly half a million investors are left waiting to hear how much of their money they will ever recover,” commented Fehmi Koru, a columnist respected among pious segments of the public.

In a typically Turkish authoritarian style—one that preceded even the ruling AKP-MHP bloc—official reactions so far have mixed ambiguous promises of a clean-up with silence. Consequently, rumours pile up, and speculation points to even higher echelons of the administration: more than 60 AKP deputies and hundreds of bureaucrats are under the spotlight of suspicion.
The main question is, naturally, how Erdoğan—recently observed as ailing and losing his well-known control over party cadres—will act and maintain authority. He has choices, but, compared with the past, a narrower margin for manoeuvre.
There is little doubt that the recent pump-and-dump choreography is the latest exposure of the massive decay in the morale of the political class, encompassing also some politicians on the opposition flank, such as Mustafa Sarıgül, a deputy of the Yeni Parti (led by Özgür Özel), who is accused of a massive embezzlement scheme and sexual harassment, and faces losing his immunity.
The overall public mood—absent street demonstrations, owing to fear and/or conformism—is primarily on display in the polls. An average of more than 12 polls I have examined shows an increasing trend among undecided and protest voters, at roughly 30 per cent; the latest GEN-AR data puts it as high as 37 per cent.
For about six months, this cluster has constituted, de facto, the largest political bloc. Needless, perhaps, to point out that the migration is noted mostly from the AKP, with some of it flowing to three tiny ultra-nationalist parties.

This is the fifth major—“existential”—challenge Erdoğan has faced in his 24-year tenure. The first was the Gezi protests in 2013, followed that same year by two massive graft probes, one of which later emerged as the Halkbank case in US courts. The third was his critical loss of a parliamentary majority in the summer of 2015, and the fourth was the attempted coup, whose background remains murky.
Preferring chaotic conditions as his usual playground, and performing best when challenged roughly, Erdoğan emerged as a winner from all of those—so much so that he even managed to transform Turkey’s century-old political system into an ultra-centralist, autocratic rule.
But he now faces a less favourable conjuncture. Foreign policy is wobblier than ever before; the recent crisis with Azerbaijan leaves him more at the mercy of his ultra-nationalist partner, Devlet Bahçeli. The so-called “peace process” — or “Terrorless Turkey” — is on hold and has become more of a stress factor, while the gap between his palace and his party grows constantly.

What to expect? Among the very few options, his most likely choice will be, while tightening the screws on dissenting views, keeping the opposition divided and weakened; and sacrificing some major—even the most surprising—figures in his orbit.
A cabinet reshuffle may be in order, but the real issue this time will be how he can revitalise a fading political force: his party, the AKP, which faces the same fate as the late Turgut Özal’s ANAP.
Consequently, Erdoğan may tie his political destiny to remaining the favoured leader of Turkey’s nationalist political forces. In plain English, all eyes should be more on Bahçeli, whose decision-making will define the course Erdoğan will have to take, more than ever, from now on.
In short, we are facing another spectacle in shrewd political engineering, which this time may promise even more chaotic circumstances, given the weakness and disintegration of the opposition.
But will the public buy a darker vortex?
If not, then what?
