In the hazy aftermath of the election, congratulations for President Recep Tayyip Erdogan rolled in from world leaders from Moscow to Kyiv, from Brussels to Washington. It was a global nod to power reaffirmed. Yet, as the triumphant whispers echoed across the continents, the depth of their resonance signaled more than a routine acknowledgement of democratic processes. It signified a realignment of geopolitical alliances. By Guney Yildiz in Forbes on May 29, 2023.
The congratulatory chorus was rife with paradoxes. Russian President Vladimir Putin referred to Erdogan as a « dear friend, » despite the tensions between Russia and NATO, to which Turkey is a member. President Zelensky, too, penned his congratulatory tweet in Turkish, labeling Erdogan a « strategic partner. » The Turkish president was met with similar, outwardly warm sentiments from President Joe Biden and UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, who recognized Erdogan as a “NATO partner. » Not to be outdone, French President Emmanuel Macron, choosing to brush past recent naval incidents, referred to Erdogan as an ally in the Mediterranean Sea.
Perhaps even more peculiar were the expressions of comradery from the Middle East and South America. Iran’s Ibrahim Raisi’s message to Erdogan lacked the jubilance of his Western counterparts, yet it signified a certain, calculated acknowledgement of Erdogan’s victory. A similar sentiment echoed from Egypt, where President Muhammad Al Sisi congratulated Erdogan against the opposition, a member of which includes Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu. This was the same Imamoglu that Erdogan once identified with Sisi, casting the 2019 Istanbul municipal election as a struggle between Sisi and the Muslim Brotherhood. Israeli President Isaac Herzog, too, voiced his country’s eagerness to continue working with Turkey and expand their ties. And across the Atlantic, Brazilian President Lula Da Silva congratulated Erdogan, marking an unusual instance of rapport with a leader more commonly compared to Brazil’s controversial Jair Bolsonaro rather than Da Silva.
China’s President Xi Jinping chimed in with the global chorus, pledging to advance the « strategic cooperative relationship » with Erdogan. This came amid the backdrop of a bitter standoff between Washington, Brussels and Kyiv against Moscow and Beijing. It seems like a strange paradox. If Erdogan is a “dear friend” to Russia and a “strategic partner” to China, how does he reconcile his status as a “NATO partner” to the US and the UK?
Evidently, the scale and tone of these congratulations were extraordinary for a mid-level country like Turkey. The words used were no casual diplomatic courtesy. They signified a profound acknowledgement of Erdogan’s influence. Meanwhile, in Turkey, Erdogan’s victory was celebrated as a victory against the U.S. and Europe, a narrative vigorously endorsed by the government supporters and senior ministers.
In this jubilant milieu of Erdogan’s win, it appears someone is making a mistake. I have been maintaining for some time, long before the election, that when it comes to judging Erdogan, I doubt it is President Putin who is erring. This might seem counterintuitive, given Erdogan’s tangled relationships and shifting allegiances. But let’s delve into why Putin, Raisi, and even Xi might not be mistaken in their assessment of Erdogan.
Erdogan’s Foreign Policy Pragmatism: Iraq and Syria as Case Studies
Erdogan’s track record is not one of ideological purity, but rather political pragmatism. Over his 21-year tenure, he hasn’t pursued a singular, ideologically-coherent line. A glaring example of this is his position during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It was Erdogan, then Prime Minister, who ardently championed allowing U.S. forces to use Turkish soil to attack Iraq, contrasting with the staunch opposition from the military and secularists. You can’t get more pro-U.S. than that in the Middle East.
Another flashpoint came with the Syrian conflict. Here, the AK Party government, under Erdogan’s leadership, briefly mediated between the Assad regime and opposition before embracing the Western policy of supporting anti-Assad forces. This dramatic pivot underscores Erdogan’s fluid approach to foreign policy, demonstrating his readiness to sway with the political winds to secure Turkey’s interests.
Shifting Alliances: Unraveling the Erdogan-Putin Relationship
Erdogan’s foreign policy compass has taken multiple 180-degree turns. Most notably, he went from backing the Islamist Syrian opposition against Assad to aiding Russia in clearing Aleppo of the same Islamist rebels, thereby dealing the most significant blow to the rebels by the Assad regime.
The Erdogan-Putin dynamic is particularly intriguing: Erdogan went from ordering the shooting down of a Russian fighter jet in 2015 to becoming fast friends with Putin. It’s worth noting he now meets with Putin more frequently than any western NATO partners. This friendship even led to the controversial acquisition of advanced S-400 air defence systems from Russia, resulting in Turkey’s expulsion from the F-35 programme due to potential Russian spying through the S-400 system.
Before these major shifts, Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East was largely outsourced. However, the gradual withdrawal of the U.S. from the region left a vacuum that Turkey initially sought to fill. The confrontation with Russia in 2015, however, highlighted Turkey’s self-made security fault lines, such as the Kurdish issue, which left it vulnerable to nations like Russia and Iran.
Turkey’s Fear Factor: Kurdish Recognition and Advanced Weaponry
Ankara feels more secure about its relationship with the West, trusting that NATO allies would not jeopardize Turkey’s security or provide sophisticated weaponry to any group linked to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). What Turkey fears most is any political recognition accorded to any Kurdish group by the West. With Russia and Iran, however, the fear is different. While Ankara remains indifferent to political recognition—after all, the Kurdish-led Democratic Union Party (PYD) maintains an office in Moscow, and the PKK is not on Moscow’s terrorism list—it is apprehensive about these two nations providing sophisticated weapons to such organizations. The mere possibility of this happening sends chills down the spines of Ankara’s elite, Erdogan included.
Paradoxically, even though the West fully supports Turkey’s concerns regarding the PKK and the broader Kurdish opposition within their own legal boundaries, it fails to gain Erdogan’s favor. This remains true despite the U.S. and Europe’s rigorous enforcement of counter-terrorism laws against the PKK. It is worth noting that the U.S. was responsible for apprehending and transferring the imprisoned PKK leader to Turkey back in 1999.
In this context, I argue that Turkey divides its foreign policy into two: dangerous enemies and high-maintenance friends. Russia, Iran, and China fall into the former category, while Western countries constitute the latter. Western alliances are high-maintenance due to the constant clamour about democracy, human rights, and standards, but these concerns, while valid, rarely translate into substantive action.
Turkey’s foreign policy has strategic and geopolitical imperatives that guide it regardless of who holds power. With Erdogan, however, the dynamic includes an element of regime survival. The President believes that while the West is friendly towards Turkey, it would prefer someone else in power. On the other hand, Putin and the Iranian establishment would rather have Erdogan in power than anyone else.
Considering this dynamic, and because Russia and Iran are classified as dangerous enemies, Erdogan will likely maintain closer relations with these nations than with the West. As I conclude, I argue that while everyone in Washington, Brussels, and Moscow celebrates Erdogan’s victory, those who might be making a mistake don’t reside in Moscow. Erdogan’s victory signifies more than just his reaffirmation.