 experienced its first major defeat in 22 years with the March 31 elections, various signs indicate Pres. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is determined to seek another term.){kind=link}
Turkey Recap, May 22, 2024, by Neslihan Çevik
Although the Justice and Development Party (AKP) experienced its first major defeat in 22 years with the March 31 elections, various signs indicate Pres. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is determined to seek another term.
But since Turkey’s constitution prohibits this, his candidacy will require the opposition’s support. And so, Erdoğan is attempting to amend the constitution, dangling the possibility of collaboration in this endeavor as a carrot for opposition parties.
Put another way, recent negotiations on constitutional amendments are intricately linked to Erdoğan’s effort to secure another term as president. The content of the amendments could take various forms as discussions progress, ranging from political openings to alterations in the presidential regime.
Currently, the main scenario appears to be changing the electoral victory threshold from the current majority requirement of 50 percent + 1 vote to a plurality of 40 percent + 1 vote.
This strategy seems to be accompanied by a messaging tactic aimed at portraying a rift between the AKP and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which is intentionally designed to mislead and play on the opposition’s wishful thinking.
Erdoğan candidacy without constitutional loopholes
A new candidacy for Erdoğan would de facto represent a fourth term and de jure a third term, despite the Turkish constitution limiting the presidency to two terms.
Because of this, his candidacy in 2023 sparked controversy. After having served as president in 2014 and 2018, it appeared Erdoğan had already completed two terms. However, the Supreme Election Council (YSK) ruled the shift to the executive presidential system in 2017 reset the term count, meaning the 2023 term would only be his second and complied with the constitution.
Unlike in 2023, Erdoğan appears to have no constitutional loopholes at his disposal for the next elections. However, there are alternative methods to enable his candidacy.
One often considered scenario is a presidential call for early elections, as allowed by the constitution. This, nevertheless, is not a viable option. Such a move would cause excessive controversy, not only domestically but also internationally – especially at a time when Turkey’s economy desperately needs foreign investment and international support.
The likely scenario ahead and the 40+1 trick
Another scenario requires amending the constitution to enable a third term.
This could be achieved through either a referendum, requiring 360 parliamentary votes, or through direct enactment in parliament, necessitating at least 400 votes with significant support from the opposition.
Opting for the latter option appears more viable considering a public referendum carries the risk of turning into a vote of confidence in the current political and economic climate.
To succeed with a direct parliamentary vote, Erdoğan would need to offer incentives to the opposition. Ongoing negotiations seem to focus on other constitutional amendments, the specifics of which may encompass a range of changes, from alterations to the political system to broader political reforms.
Within this context, lowering the presidential election threshold to 40+1 appears to be one such incentive offered at the negotiation table. The appeal for the opposition is obvious, as a reduced threshold would make it easier for them to win. It also signals the AKP may have been weakened and can no longer rely on the MHP’s electoral support.
Here is the trick though. The proposal for 40+1 is being subtly pitched to the opposition as if there is a rift or conflict between the AKP and MHP. The ruling party has been dropping hints that it’s trying to end its alliance with the MHP, a party that is generally perceived to be associated with mafia-like entities, the deep state and is often scrutinized for its militaristic and ultra-statist approach.
Such a scenario is enticing to the opposition and could possibly lead them to support constitutional changes. However, there is no evidence to suggest the AKP and MHP will not form an even closer alliance after constitutional amendments are passed.
In fact, a genuine split between the AKP and MHP would be unlikely. They have jointly established the new presidential regime. If the alliance were to end, it would likely signify the end of this regime or the result of its collapse.
Sure, there are apparent tensions between the two parties, but they are not between the leaders and seem to be primarily among lower ranking members and the bureaucracy’s cadres, who are individually pursuing their own agendas.
The most recent example of these tensions is the situation within the Ankara Police Department, where an operation against a mafia organization – allegedly associated with former Interior Min. Süleyman Soylu, a politician with strong MHP support – purportedly involved the wiretapping of high-level AKP executives.
Many view these developments as evidence of an emerging crack in the MHP-AKP alliance. However, it is also likely these events are caused by infighting between subgroups who aim to position themselves by influencing higher-ranking officials.
Essentially, the latest conflict between the MHP and AKP factions resembles a squabble between children as their parents watch from a distance, stepping in only when necessary.
CHP’s response to Erdoğan’s maneuvers
Apart from the 40+1 proposal, an additional scenario that could open Erdoğan’s way to another term is a modified presidential system that grants more power to the parliament. There may also be other options based on a system reset akin to 2023. Could this happen? Why not?
But whatever the scenario, the question remains: Is Erdoğan likely to win if he runs again? The answer depends on various factors, most prominently on the performance of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP).
By performance, I mean both the political discourse the CHP will articulate as the next general elections loom (set for 2028, but likely in 2027) and their management of the 35 municipalities the party won in this year’s local elections.
I would also add the CHP’s ability to counter the incumbent’s Byzantine-style strategic maneuvers.
Budget cuts and CHP municipalities
One such maneuver could be applied through the recently announced austerity measures in the government’s “Public Savings and Efficiency Package”. Among its objectives, the package strategically aims to portray Turkey as a credible country that “will not waste your money” as evinced by self-imposed IMF-like measures.
However, another aim of the package, which many have overlooked, may be to limit the capacity of CHP municipalities and hinder their performance before the next general elections.
On May 15, Erdoğan announced in a social media post that the package would encompass the entire public sector, including local governments. He also highlighted recent instances of nepotism in various CHP municipalities, where several mayors appointed their relatives to key positions.
“After March 31, we all see how the appointments of spouses, friends, relatives and relatives in the opposition municipalities have caused wounds in the public conscience. We expect the opposition to take responsibility for both the implementation of public austerity measures and the prevention of nepotism,” the post text stated.
Indeed, the controversy surrounding the hiring of relatives of CHP mayors presents Erdoğan with a golden opportunity. By linking potential financial restrictions with scandals of nepotism, Erdoğan would be able to address public outcry for imposing such restrictions on CHP mayors, while also undermining CHP’s governing performance.
We have entered an era of fast-paced politics where strategies can change by the minute. In this dynamic landscape, Erdoğan’s adeptness at political maneuvering could once again come to the forefront and shape the future of Turkish politics.