Before Ankara moves, Europe signs, not at sea but on paper: licenses, sustainment contracts, shipyards, submarine programs, drone ventures and fighter consortia – filed as industry, and delivered as power. When that power coerces Greece and Cyprus, the term “bilateral” is false. The file is Europe’s.
Article 42(7) is treated as a fire alarm, with aggression first and assistance after. The law is correct, the strategy is bad. A guarantee begins earlier, when EU members decide whether to arm the power built to test it.
The sharper test is export law. Common Position 2008/944/CFSP bars licenses where there is clear risk of aggressive use, force-backed territorial claims, danger to member-states or allied security, or disregard for international law, terrorism and the non-use of force. Law comes before evidence.
Turkey is not an ordinary recipient. It keeps a 1995 casus belli against Greece over Aegean territorial waters. In 2025, Kyriakos Mitsotakis tied SAFE access to Ankara revoking that threat. These are European security conditions, not bilateral objections.
Cyprus is not frozen. Turkish troops control the north. UNFICYP supervises the ceasefire lines and buffer zone. Security Council Resolutions 541 and 550 declared the secessionist entity invalid and called on states not to recognize it. In March, Turkey moved to deploy six F-16 aircraft to northern Cyprus. In late May, the EU protested after Turkey excluded Cyprus from a COP31 preparatory briefing. Even climate diplomacy meets Ankara’s refusal: an EU member-state denied its statehood.
In May, Greece asked the EU to intervene over unlawful Turkish fishing and disputed sovereign rights in the Aegean. Ankara was also preparing legislation to codify “Blue Homeland,” asserting claims across the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean. The risk is not hypothetical.
Spain is the keystone of Turkish power at sea. TCG Anadolu, Turkey’s amphibious assault ship and drone carrier, carries a Spanish architecture: the Juan Carlos I design, with Navantia design work, transfer, equipment and support to Sedef. Spain authorized €6.11 billion in arms exports to Turkey between 2013 and 2022. On July 20, 2024, the 50th anniversary of Turkey’s invasion, Anadolu joined a naval parade off Northern Cyprus. A Spain-enabled platform was displayed in the theater of an EU member-state’s occupation. No communique softens that.
Madrid stayed: In April 2026, Navantia announced Anadolu sustainment – maintenance, repair, documentation updates and training – signed in Ankara for three years, renewable for three more.
Madrid opened the next door: Turkish aerospace legitimacy. In April, Airbus and Turkish Aerospace sealed the Spanish Saeta II/Hurjet trainer project: 30 aircraft, a Spanish conversion center, industrial participation and a program into the next decade. The trainer is not the threat, the procurement success is. Madrid is normalizing Turkish defense aviation while Ankara coerces Europe’s own members.
Germany is quieter, not smaller: its weight is underwater. The Reis-class, based on the Type 214 design and built under TKMS supervision for design, materials and construction, changes the balance in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean. The first boat entered Turkish service in 2024; the second, TCG Hizirreis, followed in November 2025; the six-submarine program continues. Berlin sounds restrained. Air-independent propulsion is not.
Turkey remains high-risk until it removes the casus belli, ends maritime coercion, and accepts the legal personality of the Republic of Cyprus
Turkey has sought 40 Eurofighter Typhoons from the German-British-Italian-Spanish consortium. In July 2025, Germany moved toward clearing the delivery. In March, Britain and Turkey signed another arrangement covering air defense, Typhoon training and British industry. Spain is Ankara’s warmest political enabler. Berlin is colder, but severe: submarines below, combat aircraft above.
Italy is the unmanned gate. LBA Systems, the 50-50 Italian unmanned-aircraft joint venture created by Leonardo and Baykar, does not merely pair companies. It pairs European systems, payloads, certification and access with the platforms that made Ankara a drone power. Europe’s unmanned-systems market is projected at about $100 billion over the next decade.
France was the exception, but now it is the warning. Paris saw what others softened: Ankara was not a difficult ally but a power problem in the Eastern Mediterranean. France strengthened Greece and read the maritime map. On May 12, the warning became concrete: Safran Electronics & Defense and Baykar announced a strategic partnership in drones, smart weaponry, optronics, navigation and guided weapons, including Safran’s Euroflir electro-optical system for Baykar’s TB2 drones. France crossed the subsystem threshold: sensors, optronics, navigation, guidance – the kill chain.
Britain sits outside the EU legal contradiction and inside NATO’s strategic one. It leads the Eurofighter track, treats Ankara as a NATO-industrial opportunity and owes Greece and Cyprus no Article 42(7) duties, while Spain, Germany, Italy and France do. A Turkish aircraft is no less capable because one part of its consortium is outside the Union and three are inside it.
Next comes incorporation: Ankara as supplier, partner and industrial actor, while it refuses to recognize Cyprus, threatens Greece over lawful maritime choices and turns revisionism into doctrine and proposed law.
Greece saw it in 2020, seeking an EU arms embargo over weapons that could threaten Greek and Cypriot sovereignty. An embargo is reaction, not doctrine. Under EU law, Turkey remains high-risk until it removes the casus belli, ends maritime coercion, stops using occupied northern Cyprus as a military platform and accepts the legal personality of the Republic of Cyprus.
Until then, Turkish-linked defense cannot be normal European business: no exports, sustainment, transfer, certification or co-production that strengthens coercion against Greece or Cyprus without a Common Position finding; no EU financing, SAFE access, Horizon Europe benefits or procurement laundering; no company fixing Ankara’s bottlenecks behind a “NATO ally” label.
Europe runs two policies: Brussels promises assistance; Madrid, Berlin, Rome and Paris improve the arsenal built to test it. One calls Greek and Cypriot borders European. The other signs the invoice.
Shay Gal is a strategic analyst on international security and geopolitical strategy, advising governments and institutions on crisis management and regional power dynamics. He previously served as a vice president at Israel Aerospace Industries.